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ABSTRACT 
This paper has two parts. Part 1 presents the basic ideas underlying notional defined contribution 
(NDC) systems and discusses their main advantages and disadvantages. We argue that a NDC system 
is mainly a political device. It makes parametric reform, badly needed to stabilize the pay-as-you-go 
(PAYG) pillars all over the World, easier because it exposes the trade-offs and clarifies concepts. It 
may also change the microeconomics of labor supply and savings. It does not, however, change the 
macroeconomics of PAYG systems and thus does not substitute for the introduction of pre-funded 
second and third pillars. 
NDC systems can be installed as individual account systems, as done most prominently in Sweden. 
However, they can also be mimicked by a set of rules in a conventional defined benefits PAYG 
system, showing that NDC systems are more a political than economic devices. Part 2 describes how 
the German pension reform proposals made in late summer 2003 effectively introduce a NDC system 
without explicit NDC-type accounting. 
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What are NDC Pension Systems? 
What Do They Bring to Reform Strategies? 
 




The pressures exerted by population aging, amplified by negative incentive effects, make 
public pension systems unsustainable all over the world. The demographic pressures are 
strong in Europe because Europe has a already relatively old population. On the other hand, 
demographic change is particularly fast in Asia. Japan shares both the European level and the 
Asian speed, a particularly dangerous combination. Population aging does not spare the more 
youthful United States, but at a slower speed and level. Finally, aging also affects the 
developing countries and adds to their difficult economic and political problems. It comes to 
no surprise that pension reform is on the agenda in almost all countries of the globe. 
Pension reforms seem to follow a wave like pattern. After a wave of reforms and reform 
attempts with a strong stress on pre-funding, not the least precipitated by the World Bank’s 
“Averting” book (World Bank, 1994), the newest wave of reforms fashion “notional defined 
contribution” (NDC) systems. This paper’s aim is to make a systematic assessment of such a 
reform strategy, both in economic and political terms. 
This paper poses two questions: What are NDC systems, and what do NDC systems bring to 
pension reform. It may come as a surprise that the second question in the title has more 
quickly (and often with more confidence) been answered than the first question. 
This paper goes back to square one. It begins with the first question. While there are large 
differences between a Beveridgian defined benefit (DB) pension scheme and a NDC system, 
and large differences between a NDC system and a pre-funded defined contribution (DC) 
system, the difference between Bismarckian DB pension schemes and NDC systems is less 
clear cut, both in terms of the underlying economic substance and the perception in the 
political arena. 
We therefore provide a taxonomy of pension systems which enables us to structure our   3
answers to both questions. We show how blurred the distinction between conventional DB 
and NDC systems can become, and we try to condense the economic meaning of NDC. 
Our answer to the second question follows the same line. Properly designed NDC systems can 
contain very powerful economic and political mechanisms that may alleviate pension reform, 
such as transparency and accountability. Cleverly designed DB systems, however, may often 
do the same job and in some circumstances maybe even better. Whether NDC systems bring 
new life into the pension debate is therefore a question of the historical path and the nature of 
the debate in each single country. 
Section 2 sets the stage by stressing the most important challenges which NDC systems are 
supposed to master. Section 3 is conceptual and devoted to the paper’s first question. It 
defines a NDC system on the mechanical level and then proceeds to extract its economic and 
political core. We contrast this to DB and FDC schemes. Section 4 answers the second 
question. It discusses the pros and cons of an NDC system in terms of economics, the 
perception of workers and pensioners, and the political process. Section 5 provides a real-life 
example of a well-known conventional DB system which almost perfectly mimics a NDC 
system. This is the German “point system” augmented by a so-called “sustainability factor” as 
proposed by the German government’s reform commission for the “sustainability in financing 
the social insurance systems”. Section 6 concludes and picks up the challenges described in 
Section 2: which of those challenges can be mastered by NDC systems, and which challenges 
must be addressed by other economic and political mechanisms, notably pre-funding. 
2. The challenges 
The first and foremost challenge to pension systems around the globe is population aging, 
heralded for a long time by often-cited publications such as OECD (1988) and World Bank 
(1994). The consequences of demographic change have now reached many countries in a per-
ceptible way. Population aging is becoming one of the secular “mega trends” of the new cen-
tury. 
Demographic change has two distinct components: a decline in fertility and an increase in 
longevity. The fertility decline is most pronounced in Europe and occurred as a historically 
unparalleled and in many countries rather sudden succession of the baby boom in the late Fif-
ties and early Sixties followed by the baby bust in the Seventies. In the developing countries, 
fertility decline is less sudden, but still steady and incisive. The secular increase in life expec-  4
tancy is largely owed to the progress in medical technology. With an unchanged or even de-
clining retirement age, the longevity increase has led to a massive expansion of the pension 
systems. 
Coping with these two demographic developments requires two strategies. To deal with the 
sudden decline in fertility due to the babyboom/babybust transition, a reduction of the pay-as-
you-go (PAYG) replacement rate for the babyboomers and, simultaneously, an increase of 
privately financed pre-funded pensions substituting for part of the PAYG pensions seems un-
avoidable in those countries which already have very high payroll taxes. Increasing longevity, 
in turn, is most naturally addressed by an increase of the length of working life, i.e. a higher 
retirement age. 
Demography is, however, not the only challenge to current pension systems. The European 
economies – and not only they – face two deeply routed macroeconomic problems: poor 
growth and high unemployment. The most pressing goal of economic policy is therefore to 
increase employment (and thereby growth), not the least in order to provide the economic 
base which should support the social security systems in general, and the pension system in 
particular. If at least a part of pension contributions is perceived as distortionary taxes, the 
demographic and macroeconomic challenges interact with each other through the wedge 
which pension contributions drive between total labor costs paid by employers and net earn-
ings received by employees. Germany is a striking example where population aging and mac-
roeconomic weakness combine to create serious economic problems. Germany has the lowest 
economic growth rate among all EU countries. At the same time, Germany has by far the 
highest labor costs (total hourly labor compensation) within the EU (IW, 2003). Much of the 
thinking of current German pension reform is guided by the conviction that the goal of more 
growth demands more employment, and more employment demands at least a stabilization of, 
better a reduction of, payroll taxes and tax-like contributions. 
Stabilizing or reducing contribution rates, however, requires cost cutting. This can be done by 
shifting the retirement age or by reducing pension benefits. Both reform strategies cut deeply 
into existing claims. It is an illusion to sell the necessary structural reform steps as a „win-
win“ situation. Neither a reduction of the replacement rate, nor an increase of the retirement 
age, is popular. To minimize negative coalitions against reform, employees should therefore 
be able to choose as flexibly as possible between the two unpopular options.   5
Many people, in particular in Europe, view pension systems as social achievements that one 
must defend, no matter how much the demographic and macroeconomic environment has 
changed. Hence, a change of paradigm is necessary from thinking what one wishes to claim 
towards thinking what can be financed. This requires a change in the rhetoric of our pension 
systems; it also requires a transparent statement of the current systems’ costs which supports 
this rhetoric. 
There are further political challenges. Confidence in the PAYG pension systems is steadily 
declining during the past two decades (Börsch-Supan and Miegel, 2001). This poses a huge 
political challenge since every reform has to prove that things will eventually get better than 
without reform. Rhetoric alone will not bring confidence back, in particular because it has 
been discredited in the past. What is needed – not only for a change of paradigm, but also to 
restore confidence – is transparency and a credible reform process. Adjustment processes 
should be gradual. Any kind of emergency operations undermine credibility. The recent his-
tory of German reform provides bad examples, such as the 2000 unexpected discretionary 
indexation rule change and the 2002 contribution rate hikes, after much of the liquidity re-
serve had been given up during the last business cycle upturn, exposing the pension system to 
sudden changes and thereby further undermining confidence in the PAYG system. 
Another challenge consists in the many bad microeconomic design features in existing PAYG 
systems that create negative incentive effects. Defined benefit (DB) systems that base benefits 
solely on last year’s earnings, for example, do not reward additional years of work and yield 
incentives for strongly backloaded earnings. Other examples are systems that provide benefits 
which are not actuarially related to retirement age. There is strong evidence that the negative 
incentive effects exerted by such systems have shifted the effective retirement age to substan-
tially earlier ages, and thus contributed to the financial pressures on PAYG systems (Gruber 
and Wise, 1999; Börsch-Supan and Schnabel, 1998, 1999; Börsch-Supan, 2000). In Germany, 
early retirement makes up for almost 25 percent of the old-age pension budget, corresponding 
to almost 5 percentage points of the contribution rate (Börsch-Supan et al., 2003a,b). 
Negative labor supply incentives are an important reason to make contributions closely reflect 
pension benefits (“equivalence” or “insurance principle”). It minimizes the tax-character of 
contributions. Ideally, a fully equivalent pension system with an internal rate of return equal 
to a suitably risk-adjusted capital return has no tax-character at all. In turn, violating the 
equivalence principle, relatively low rates of return, and a lack of credibility all add to the tax-  6
character of contributions and thus to labor market distortions. In a similar vein, flexibility to 
choose the date for retirement entry and the abolition of earnings tests minimize distortions in 
the choice between labor and leisure and should therefore also minimize tax-like distortions. 
In summary, the challenges are manifold. Population aging creates financial pressures on pen-
sion systems, requiring unpopular cuts in benefits and retirement duration; macroeconomic 
growth and employment problems are amplified by pension systems if and when pension con-
tributions are perceived as distortionary taxes; reforms may lack political credibility in the 
same way as the underlying PAYG systems have lost their credibility; and a host of bad de-
sign elements on the microeconomic level requires fixing in order to minimize negative incen-
tive effects. 
3. Notional Defined Contribution Systems 
Notional Defined Contribution (NDC) systems are supposed to address these economic and 
political challenges. Proponents argue that NDC systems make a large step to solve all these 
problems in one big stroke (Palmer, 2000; Chlon, Gora and Rutkowski, 1999). Skeptics argue 
that they add little new but may distract from deeper reform (Disney, 1999; Valdes-Prieto, 
2000). 
Notional defined contribution systems were legislated 1994 in Sweden and 1995 in Italy, 
among other countries. In Sweden, the new system was introduced for all employees with a 
15-year transition period. It will be fully implemented within a few years from now. Palmer 
(2000) provides a good description of the Swedish NDC system and its introduction. In Italy, 
the NDC system was introduced as part of the so-called Dini-Reform with a very long transi-
tion period. It will be relevant only for workers who are younger than the baby boom genera-
tion. Franco and Sator (2003) provide a critical evaluation. While Sweden and Italy are the 
most often quoted examples of NDC systems, Latvia and Poland have actually served as trial 
grounds for these reforms (Rutkowski, 1998; Gora and Rutkowski, 1998; Fox and Palmer, 
1999; Chlon-Domiszak and Gora, 2003). 
What are notional defined contribution systems? What are their mechanics, and what is the 
economic essence of NDC systems?   7
3.1  The mechanics of a NDC system 
NDC systems are accounting devices that treat a PAYG system like a defined contribution 
(DC) systems. Pension benefits are paid out of current contributions like in a conventional 
PAYG system, but the link between benefits and contributions is individualized and defined 
by the NDC accounting mechanism. 
Like any other DC system, the system starts with the individual contributions to the pension 
system which are credited to, and accumulated on, individual accounts kept by the pension 
system. The balance is fictitious (or “notional”) since no capital is accumulated. The accumu-
lated sum represents the fictitious (or “notional”) pension wealth. 
The balance earns interest at some rate of return. The magnitude of this return is a central pa-
rameter of the NDC system. Since no capital is accumulated and the claims on the balance are 
not traded, there is no market-mechanism to determine the rate of return.
1  Viewed from a 
macroeconomic perspective, the “natural” rate of return for a NDC system is the implicit re-
turn of a PAYG system, i.e. the growth rate of the contribution bill. However, some NDC sys-
tems – such as the Swedish system – have chosen rates of return which are higher under cur-
rent circumstances, such as the rate of wage growth. 
When entering retirement, the notional pension wealth is converted into a lifelong pension 
(„annuitized“) according to actuarial rules. The annual pension benefit depends on three vari-
ables: 
•  the notional pension wealth (proportionality guarantees equivalence) 
•  the interest rate used to compute the annuity (using the implicit rate of return from the 
PAYG system guarantees equivalence within each birth cohort), and 
•  the remaining life expectancy (using up-to-date cohort-specific life tables guarantees actu-
arial sustainability). 
The two last elements are often combined and referred to as “annuitization divisors” or “G-
values” in Sweden and Latvia.
2  In Italy, these values have been tabulated. Benefits B are then 
                                                 
1 Valdes-Prieto (2003) suggests a potential trading mechanism. 
2 In Sweden, the G-value is the remaining unisexual life expectancy at retirement age, reduced by the effect of 
compound interest during retirement. The assumed interest rate is 1.6%, modified, if the growth of contributions 
is unusually low, by the “automatic balancing mechanism”. For details see Settergren (2001).   8
B = PW/G, 
where NPW denotes the notional pension wealth. 
Including the implicit rate of return from a PAYG system and including the expected length 
of retirement in the benefit calculation links pension benefits to the demographic and em-
ployment parameters of the macroeconomic environment. This makes NDC systems more 
sustainable than conventional DB systems in the sense that changes in the demographic and 
macroeconomic environment automatically lower benefits. 
Including the remaining life expectancy links benefits to the retirement age at the individual 
level. This makes NDC systems actuarially neutral (at the employed rate of interest). 
Since the present discounted value (PDV) of pension benefits is independent from the actual 
retirement age, the financial burden of the younger generation is fixed for each cohort and 
determined by the G-value, i.e. the notional interest rate and the expected average duration of 
retirement. 
The actual properties of a NDC system depend on many detailed design features. They are 
discussed in subsection 4.3. At this point, we just stress three features. First and foremost, the 
determination of the “notional” interest rate is central since it governs both the demographic 
and macroeconomic sustainability of the system and the microeconomic incentive effects. 
Second, it makes a big difference which life tables are used. Third, the extent to which retirees 
are protected from future shocks is an important parameter potentially conflicting with finan-
cial sustainability. 
NDC accounting systems do not change the mechanics of PAYG systems, i.e. the necessity to 
adapt either the contributions or the replacement rate (or both) to changes in the demographic 
or macroeconomic environment. This is an important point. The current young generation 
pays the current old generation. The determination of the notional interest rate and the esti-
mated remaining life expectancy amounts to the specification of the link between benefits 
(represented by some replacement rate) and contributions (represented by some payroll-tax 
rate). By changing this link, the system can shift the burden of population aging between the 
younger and the older generation. A NDC system, however, cannot mimic a pre-funded sys-
tem in the sense that the financial burden of a cohorts’ worth of pension benefits will be car-
ried by that same cohort.   9
3.2  The economic essence of a NDC system 
Stripped down to its economic essence, three mechanisms are the crucial ingredients which 
make a PAYG system a NDC system: 
(1) An accounting mechanism that credits all life-time earnings 
(2) A mechanism linking the final balance with the demographic and macroeconomic 
environment 
(3) An actuarial rule converting the final balance into an annuity. 
In order to stress the last point made in the preceding subsection, we add a fourth element 
which distinguishes notional from funded DC plans: 
(4) Claims on future benefits are not collaterized with real capital but promises by a 
(almost always) government-related entity. 
The first mechanism is realized by crediting all life-time contributions to an individual 
account, just like funded DC plans. This parallels in many respects the German and French 
point systems, except that the unit of credit is currency (Euro), not earnings points (Legros, 
2003). It substantially differs from the many pension systems in which only the x best years 
are credited (at the extreme only last year’s earnings), and of course from Beveridgian 
systems that provide flat benefits. 
The second mechanisms is realized in NDC systems by the notional interest rate which 
reflects, if chosen to be the internal rate of return of a PAYG system, demographic changes, 
employment changes, and productivity changes, since the contribution bill grows with the rate 
at which the number of contributors and their labor productivity increases. This mechanism 
parallels the indexation rules of conventional DB systems: most pension systems index their 
benefits at retirement to the current wage level. Most conventional PAYG systems add 
discretionary adaptations of the replacement rate to demographic changes; one of the main 
features of NDC systems is the direct and automatic linkage to demography once the notional 
interest includes the growth rate of the contribution base. In funded DC plans, the 
demographic and macroeconomic environment enters benefits through exactly the same 
mechanism as in NDC systems, namely through the market rate of interest. 
The third mechanism is the essence of the B=NPW/G rule. Proportionality between B and 
NPW and an actuarially correct determination of the G-values makes a NDC system   10
actuarially neutral and, within each cohort, also actuarially fair (see Disney 2003 for this 
taxonomy). Some conventional PAYG systems have actuarial adjustments, notably the US 
Social Security system between age 62 and 65. Most funded DC plans are automatically 
actuarially neutral, since conversion to an annuity takes place at actual retirement. Many DB-
type PAYG systems, however, have no or little linkage between annual benefits and 
retirement age (Gruber and Wise, 1999). 
3.3  A taxonomy of pension systems 
How close are NDC systems then to funded DC systems? And how close are they to 
conventional PAYG-financed DB systems? The taxonomy in table 1 serves to clarify matters. 
It distinguishes pension systems by four dimensions which are closely related to the four 
elements listed in the preceding subsection. The many possible design features in real life, 
however, add additional complexity to these four dimensions. We do not claim that all 
dimensions are covered (e.g., voluntary vs. mandatory).
3 
Table 1: Dimensions of pension systems 
(1) Credits for contributions 
      Base:    Life-long.....Best x years.....Final salary…..Flat 
      Weights:    Early vs. later contributions (-> interest).....Equal (point system) 
 (2) Accrual of interest: 
      Rate:    r.....g…..n+g        (Aaron-Samuelson) 
 (3) Conversion to benefits: 
      Conversion:  Linear (equivalence)…….Concave (redistributive) 
      Indexation:  NDC: B=NPW/G….…DB: B=f(credits, other; accrual rate) 
      Actuarial:   Neutral (margin!) at retirement......Flat 
      Risk:    Benefits frozen at retirement.....Indexation rules.....Fully adjustable 
(4) Funding: 
     Extent:    No fund at all.......Reserve buffer.......Fully funded 
     Collateral:   None…..Government bonds......Commercial bonds/stocks 
One of the main features of Table 1 is that all of the dimensions provide a continuum of 
allocations within each dimension. NDC systems often enforce an extreme position along a 
dimension, but conventional DB systems may come close in some of the dimensions of 
                                                 
3 See the textbooks by Homburg (1988) and Valdes-Prieto (1999).   11
Table 1. 
In terms of crediting contributions, NDC systems do indeed take an extreme position: 
contributions are credited on a life-time basis and earlier contributions get a higher weight 
according to the rate of interest. While the German point system also credits all life-time 
contributions, the point system weights all contributions equally, independent of time. This 
corresponds to ignoring compound interest, see below. The French point system credits only 
the best 25 years; the US Social Security system permits taking out the 5 worst years, which 
creates less labor supply disincentives than the French system. Many systems in developing 
countries use only last year’s earnings,
4 and in strictly Beveridgian systems such as the Dutch 
or British base pensions, credits do not play a role in the determination of benefits at all since 
benefits are flat.
5 
NDC systems feature a “natural” accrual of interest through the crediting mechanism. 
However, the conversion factor between benefits at retirement and the sum of contributions 
over the working life can be interpreted as crediting all accrued interest at the time of 
retirement (Ruland, 2000). While the latter mechanism ignores compound interest because it 
does not matter when contributions are paid over the working life, there is no other genuine 
difference between NDC systems and a DB formula that (implicitly) credits the accrued 
interest at retirement. The determination of the rate of interest is another matter. In a funded 
system, the internal rate of return is r, the market rate of interest. In a PAYG system, it is n+g, 
where  n is the rate of growth of the contribution base, and g the growth rate of labor 
productivity. In Sweden, the government choose g als the notional rate of interest, leaving out 
a direct link of accruing interest to demography.
6  In an aging population, n+g tends to be 
smaller than g since n is negative, and it is in most circumstances much smaller than r.
7 
The third dimension relates to the conversion of the accumulated notional wealth into benefits 
at and after retirement. There are four elements in that conversion. First, how are individual 
                                                 
4 Börsch-Supan, Palacios and Tumbarella (1999) 
5 This is strictly true only in citizenship or residence-based flat benefit systems (e.g., Australia). In the UK, a 
minimum number of credits determines eligibility. 
6 Demography enters directly through longevity-dependent annuities and indirectly through feedbacks that 
change g, for instance via age-specific productivity. Sweden also has a re-balancing mechanism which will re-
spond to demography once the current system fails, see Settergren (2001). 
7 The theoretical relation between r and n+g in and out of steady state and its relation to dynamic efficiency fills 
volumes and is not subject of this paper. See Valdes-Prieto (1998). For some enlightening empirical results, see 
Schnabel (1998).   12
credits related to individual benefits. NDC systems use simple proportionality by applying the 
B=NPW/G rule. Some DB systems have the same proportionality, e.g. the point systems in 
France and Germany or systems with a simple accrual rate rule, while the US Social Security 
system credits additional contributions at a decreasing value – the system redistributes 
through a concave linkage function between contributions and benefits. In a strictly 
Beveridgian system, credits play no role at all, as mentioned before. 
The second element is how benefits are related to the demographic and macroeconomic 
environment. In NDC systems, this is expressed in the G-values. Conventional DB systems 
usually have benefit indexation rules which link the benefits at retirement to the current wage 
or earnings level.
8  They fail to include demographic factors directly, although there may be 
indirect linkages. Indexation to net wages, for instance, where net means net of taxes and 
contributions, entails an indirect linkage since rising contributions, precipitated by population 
aging, will also reduce benefits. There is nothing, however, to prevent DB formulae from 
including direct linkages to demography to increase the elasticity of benefits with respect to 
demographic changes, and we will show a concrete example in Section 5. 
The third element is the relation between retirement age and benefits. NDC systems are 
automatically actuarially neutral in the sense that the PDV of benefits is not affected by the 
actual retirement age if the PDV is computed at the internal rate of return of the NDC system. 
However, workers may use a different rate of interest when they are computing the PDV in 
order to make retirement decisions. This difference then creates a wedge between actuarial 
neutrality and the absence of labor supply disincentives, the latter being defined as the case in 
which the PDV of benefits is independent of the retirement age, if the PDV is computed using 
the personal discount rate of workers. The crucial question is then, what is the personal 
discount rate of workers? If it is the market rate of interest, then it is usually larger than the 
internal rate of return of the NDC system, especially in times of aging populations.
9 
This is an important point: NDC systems may be actuarially neutral, but they may still create 
substantial labor supply disincentives. They may be more neutral than DB systems which 
apply very small adjustments of annual benefits to retirement age (such as the German 
                                                 
8 Note the difference between the initial indexation at retirement for the flow of new entrants and the indexation 
of benefits after retirement for the stock of existing retirees. 
9 Empirically measured personal discount rates tend be even larger than r, and this by a substantial margin, see 
the survey by Frederick, Loewenstein and O’Donoghue (2002).   13
adjustments of 3.6% p.a. phased in after 2001, see Section 5.2), and certainly than systems in 
which annual benefits are independent of retirement age (such as the German system before 
2001), but NDC systems may be more distortive than DB systems that apply large 
adjustments (such as the UK with adjustments of 9% p.a.). NDC systems may provide a most 
“natural” way to compute retirement-age specific adjustments, but again: there is nothing 
intrinsic in this respect that distinguishes NDC from DB systems with actuarial neutral (or 
larger) adjustments such as the US Social Security system at age 62 to 65. 
Finally, the fourth element is the indexation of benefits after retirement (different from the 
indexation, or anchoring, of benefits at retirement). Conventional DB systems index benefits 
after retirement to cost of living (US, Italian new system) or net wages (France, Germany) or 
some combination in between (Switzerland). In funded DC systems, this is represented by the 
type of annuity (real or nominal, or any other schedule). The Swedish NDC system freezes the 
benefits in real terms, corresponding to a cost-of-living indexation. Again, NDC systems 
provide no special features in this respect. 
By now, it should be clear that NDC systems are accounting devices with properties which 
can (but maybe not politically easily) be introduced in conventional DB systems as well. They 
may serve to provide more transparency and credibility because some features come more 
“naturally” in a NDC system than through complex formulae in a DB system, but it is more 
rhetoric than economic substance which distinguishes NDC and DB. In fact, Lindeman, 
Robalino and Rutkowski (2003) show under which conditions NDC and DB schemes are 
mathematically equivalent, and we will present in Section 5 the example of the new German 
DB system which almost perfectly mimics a NDC system. 
How is NDC different from a funded DC plan? This is addressed in the fourth dimension of 
Table 1. Most PAYG systems have some reserve fund, although the size of it varies greatly. 
The Swedish reserve fund amounts to some 5 years of expenditures, while the German 
system’s reserve fund is minimal with a few days worth of expenditures. The crucial question, 
however, is whether the accumulated balances are collateralized and which claims represent 
the collateral. NDC systems are “notional” in the sense that there is no collateral at all. 
Balances are claims against future tax payers, and they are not backed by a financial   14
instrument.
10  Funded DC plans are usually understood as being collateralized against 
physical capital, mostly through financial instruments such as commercial bonds or stocks. 
We use the word “funded” only for these plans. Some authors also call those DC plans that 
are collateralized with government bonds “funded”. We think that this is a misuse of the word 
“funded”. While benefit claims of such plans are marketable and yield a well-defined rate of 
interest, they do not represent claims on physical capital. NDC systems may permit a 
“natural” way to make the implicit debt of a PAYG system explicit by linking the NDC 
balances to government bonds, and the resulting insights about future benefits and 
contributions may create saving incentives on the microeconomic level. However, NDC 
systems and conventional DB systems share the crucial macroeconomic features of PAYG 
systems: NDC systems do not accumulate savings in real assets with the potential beneficial 
side effects on the national saving rate, capital market development and growth (Holzmann, 
1997; Schmidt-Hebbel, 1998; Börsch-Supan and Winter, 2001). NDC systems are therefore 
no substitute for pre-funding. 
4. Pros and Cons of Notional Defined Contribution Systems 
We now turn to the second question of the paper: What do notional contribution systems bring 
to pension reform? What are their advantages and disadvantages? Since we have seen in the 
preceding sections that NDC systems can almost perfectly be mimicked by conventional DB 
systems, we focus on the psychological and political aspects of a new rhetoric. This does not 
mean that we ignore the microeconomic implications of transparency and credibility. We will 
stress that they are important for pension reform. They are, however, sometimes quite subtle 
and indirect. 
4.1  Advantages 
A NDC system 
•  adapts itself automatically through an internal interest mechanism to the changed balance 
of contributors to pensioners (baby boom/baby bust problem) without the necessity to in-
tervene discretionarily; 
                                                 
10 This could be changed by converting the implicit claims on the contributions of future workers in explicit 
claims on future taxes backed by government bonds, see Valdes-Prieto (2003).   15
•  through the actuarial conversion of the notional pension wealth into a life-long pension, 
the system adapts itself automatically to changed life expectancies (longevity problem); 
reductions for early retirement result automatically and are automatically adapted to the 
demographic situation (this adaptation is incomplete when benefits are frozen at retire-
ment and pensioners are effectively insulated against subsequent changes of longevity); 
•  avoids arbitrariness of benefit indexation rules, adjustment factors, etc., the change of 
which have undermined the credibility of many unfunded DB systems; 
•  strengthens the equivalence principle and for this reason minimizes the wedge between 
gross and net income, which results from the distortionary impact of taxes and tax-like 
contributions; 
•  adds transparency to the PAYG pillar by clearly identifying individual contributions and 
the resulting benefit claims, helping to regain credibility; 
•  strengthens the principle that pensions are based on life-long earnings, and honors em-
ployees who enter the labor market early; 
•  transfer mechanisms can be easily identified as in-lieu contributions; notably tax-financed 
credits for higher and vocational education and similar credits for educating children; 
•  creates a framework, which can consistently be enlarged to a general „accounting system“ 
of all PAYG subsystems; advantages and disadvantages of joining subsystems (e.g. civil 
servants and self employed) will become immediately obvious in such an accounting sys-
tem; 
•  produces a suitable framework for independent pensions of spouses; 
•  creates a homogeneous paradigm for the first, second, and third pillar of a multiple-pillar 
system; hence, it may increase the acceptance of the second and third pillar which are re-
garded as “alien” system components in those countries which used to have a monolithic 
first-pillar dominated pension system; and 
•  permits a considerable amount of flexibility for employees in choosing their retirement 
age; makes the inflexible and politically problematic fixation of a „normal“ retirement age 
superfluous; and it exposes the trade-off between accumulated contributions and retire-
ment age in an internally consistent fashion.   16
4.2 Disadvantages 
One of the main strength of NDC systems, namely transparency, comes with some obvious 
disadvantages in the political realm: 
•  The financial situation of an unsustainable PAYG system becomes more obvious since 
workers “see” their declining benefits (while contribution rates are increasing) on their 
own accounts – thereby translating a general knowledge about the financial situation of 
the pension system into a personal concern. This is the flip side of the advantage of trans-
parency; it may turn into a disadvantage, some think, because this may undermine confi-
dence even more. 
•  If the contribution rate is fixed, the replacement rate becomes uncertain since it is depend-
ent on the future development of earnings and demography. The replacement rate cannot 
serve any longer as a political instrument. This is of course the essence of a defined con-
tribution system, including a notional one, but the uncertainty will become painfully visi-
ble in a NDC accounting system. 
•  The system does not change the tension between business cycle related earnings declines 
and long term spending commitments. Therefore, a genuine liquidity reserve is necessary. 
In countries where it has been depleted, it must be rebuild, even if this means sacrificing 
lower or installing higher contribution rates, especially during business cycle upswings. 
•  If the annuity is frozen at the beginning of retirement, a stabilizing feedback mechanism is 
missing if there is an unexpected rise in life expectancy. With a fixed contribution rate, the 
system will not automatically obey the annual budget restriction of a conventional PAYG 
system.
11 
•  Discretionary decisions are more hidden – they take place at the choice of life table, com-
putation rules (such as the averaging) for the internal rate of return, the determination of a 
minimum retirement age, etc. 
•  The system does not change the fact that only pre-funding can change which generation 
pays for a given pension benefit. If one wants to have the workers of generation x at least 
partially pay for their own pension, rather than their children in generation x+1, some ex-
                                                 
11 For a clearly stated mathematical exposition of this point, see Valdes-Prieto (2000).   17
tent of pre-funding is necessary. A NDC system is no replacement for such partial fund-
ing. It is only an optimization of the PAYG pillar. 
4.3 Design details 
This is not the place to discuss the many design issues that must be resolved in order to estab-
lish a NDC system.
12  We mention only some especially important ones: 
•  Like any other PAYG system, a minimum age must be established when healthy workers 
may begin to receive a pension. Such a minimum retirement age is necessary unless one 
makes the participation in the PAYG system optional which is, especially in times of 
population aging, not a stable solution. None of the existing NDC systems have an auto-
matic adjustment of the minimum retirement age to longevity, hence, the existing systems 
do only respond partially to demographic changes. 
•  Specification and update of life tables have immediate consequences for benefits. Most 
countries so far have adapted unisex life tables based on cross-sectional data. Actuarially 
correct are cohort tables, with some projection for changes in life expectancy. Many coun-
tries do not have a reliable mechanism to compute such tables. An independent board of 
actuaries should supervise the construction of such tables, and the life tables should be 
consistent with those used in the private pension sector. 
•  The internal interest of the contributions (growth rate of the contribution bill) must be 
smoothened over time. Several models are on hand. A moving average across a business 
cycle seems to be the natural choice. Peaks should be leveled off to flow into the liquidity 
reserve, used for the troughs of a cycle. Designing such smoothening mechanisms is not 
trivial since the amplitude and duration of a business cycle is not known in advance, and 
we do not have foolproof mechanisms to distinguish trends from cycles. 
•  Since the implicit rate of return of a PAYG system is often substantially lower than the 
workers’ discount rates, incentive effects to retire early may still be large if later pension 
uptake is governed by actuarial neutrality. From a macroeconomic point of view, it is not 
obvious whether actuarial neutrality (using the internal rate of return of the PAYG system) 
or absence of incentive effects (using the workers’ discount rate) is welfare maximizing. 
                                                 
12 See Palmer (2003) for many of such details.   18
•  There are many ways to design the annuities. They can be chosen to rise with inflation or 
with wages, or any other schedule; the initial level is adjusted accordingly, holding PDV 
over expected duration constant. The freedom to choose is probably more important than 
potential problems with adverse selection. However, we have little experience so far with 
such trade-offs. 
•  Benefits are determined at the beginning of retirement, but the demographic and economic 
environment may unexpectedly change after such determination. If the growth rate of con-
tributions is very low, pensions may fall in real terms, which is politically unattractive. 
Some adaptation to the new environment is probably optimal, but pensioners seem to 
value protection quite highly. The overall welfare-maximizing policy is not known so far. 
As we have stressed before, if pensioners are fully protected from demographic and eco-
nomic changes taking place after they entered retirement, NDC systems loose an impor-
tant feedback mechanism which may undermine long-run financial sustainability. If pen-
sions are protected by a floor (say, never fall in real or nominal terms), the system can be-
come financially unbalanced because expenditures and contributions are treated asymmet-
rically: Expenditures cannot fall below a certain floor, while contributions can. 
•  The rules for the transition period should follow the Swedish, not the Italian model, since 
the extremely lengthy Italian transition time does not permit the NDC system to address 
the most urgent financial problem – the strain on the pension budget that which will occur 
when the baby boom generation retires. A more difficult question is the extent to which 
existing pensions should be protected. “Natural” transition paths can be constructed when 
benefits are defined pro rata in proportion to the time spent under current and new law. 
The transition can be faster if important design elements of a NDC system are already in 
place. In Germany, for instance, a relatively short transition period (from 2005 through 
2020) would be possible because the existing point system has an important feature of 
NDC systems already in place. 
5. A Blend of DB and NDC: The German Point System and the 
Sustainability Indexation 
In this final section, we use the proposed new German public pension system as an example 
of a DB system that quite closely mimics a NDC system. Three ingredients are the main   19
elements of the German public pension system: the point system of credits, the actuarial 
adjustments, and the benefit indexation formula. During the recent pension reform process,
13 
these elements have been changed consistently in the direction of NDC-type pensions. 
The point system, described in detail further below in Subsection 5.1, is a feature of the 
German pension system since its conversion to a PAYG system in 1957. Actuarial 
adjustments have been legislated by the 1992 reform; they are phased in since 1997, with the 
bulk of adjustments in force by 2007. As a result, effective retirement ages are expected to 
increase by about two years within the next ten years.
14  In 2001, the so-called “Riester 
reform” made a first step from a purely pay-ay-you-go to a capital funded pension system: it 
established upper limits to the contribution rate, discontinued the benefits indexation formula, 
and substantially lowered pension levels. At the same time, the Riester reform introduced 
state-subsidized supplementary private pensions (“Riester pensions”) in order to fill the 
upcoming pension gap. However, these reforms did not suffice to stabilize public pension 
finances. In late Fall of 2002, the government established a reform commission to achieve 
“sustainability in financing the social insurance systems”. A broad majority of this 
commission took the view that the upper limit of the contribution rate legally anchored by the 
Riester reform must be adhered to, and consequently changed the benefit indexation formula 
to follow an income-oriented policy. This change has been approved by the government and 
passed the Bundestag in first reading in Fall 2003. Details of this new indexation mechanism 
are described below in Subsection 5.3. This was the last step which in effect turned the 
German DB system into a NDC-type pension system. 
5.1 The German point system 
The German public pension system computes benefits according to the following formula: 
                                                 
13 Börsch-Supan and Wilke (2003) present a detailed description of the pension reform process. 
14 Econometric estimates are provided in Berkel and Börsch-Supan (2003).   20
Bt,i = PVt * EPi * AAi 
where 
Bt,i  = Benefits of pensioner i in year t, 
PVt = Current pension value in year t, 
EPi = Number of individual earnings points collected by pensioner i until his retirement 
AAi = Actuarial adjustment, dependent on the retirement age of pensioner i. 
Benefits therefore have a simple structure: an individual component EPi * AAi determined by 
each person’s earnings history and retirement age which stays fixed for the entire retirement 
period, and an aggregate component PVt which adjusts benefits over time equally for all 
pensioners. 
EPi represents the “point system” and AAi is determined by actuarial accounting rules, see 
below. A typical worker who works for 40 years and earns the average labor income in each 
of these 40 years receives 40 earnings points. If this worker retires at age 65, no actuarial 
adjustments take place (AA=1). In the second half of 2002, the current pension value PVt was 
25.86 Euro.
15  Hence this typical worker receives a pension of 1034.40 Euro per month. A 
worker who has worked for 20 years at average earnings, or a worker, who has worked for 40 
years at 50% of average earnings, will receive half of these pension benefits, while workers 
who earn twice the average labor income for 40 years will receive twice as much as the 40 
year average earner. 
5.2 The actuarial adjustments 
Before 1992, adjustment of benefits to retirement age was only implicit via additional 
earnings points. For a worker with 40 years of service at the average earnings level, an 
additional year of service would therefore increase the annual pension benefit by 2.5%. There 
were no further actuarial adjustments. The 1992 reform changed this, and the changes are 
currently being phased in.
16  Age 65 will then act as the “pivotal age” for benefit 
computations. Benefits will be reduced by 3.6% (maximum 10.8%) for each year of earlier 
retirement. The 1992 reform also introduced rewards for later retirement: for each year of 
postponement, benefits increase by 6%. There is some debate whether these percentage 
                                                 
15 This value was determined by the goal to provide a 70% ratio between the average pension and the average 
earnings level, see Section 5.3 below. 
16 See Berkel and Börsch-Supan (2003) for details of the transition process.   21
adjustments are actuarial neutral.
17  The German Reform Commission took a cautious position 
by stating that “the adjustments are low, but probably suffiently close to actuarial neutral”.
18  
At conventional discount rates, they still exert negative incentives to retire early of 
considerable magnitude.
19 
5.3 The benefit indexation formula 
Each year, currently on July 1, the current pension value PVt is recalculated with the aid of the 
benefit indexation formula. Until recently, this benefit indexation formula was essentially a 











PV PV  
where 
PVt:  Current pension value in year t 
ANW:  Average earnings of all employees subject to compulsory insurance, net of taxes and social insurance 
contributions 
Since the current pension value PVt has a direct influence on every individual pension, the 
benefit indexation formula is a critical determinant for the well-being of pensioners and the 
amount of money spent by the public pension scheme.
20  However, the benefit indexation 
formula gives no direct reference to the demographics of the system, nor to the number of 
employed persons, although there is a feedback through net earnings: higher contributions 
dampen net earnings, thus also pension benefits, incorporation a kind of burden sharing 
between generations. The limitations of this feedback mechanism are one reason for the 
unsustainability of the German pay-as-you-go system. 
Starting in 2005, the benefit indexation formula will be augmented by a “sustainability factor” 
which incorporates demography and employment into the German benefit indexation formula. 
Specifically, it indexes benefits also to the numbers of contributors and pensioners. The 
relative number of contributors to pensioners, the so-called system dependency ratio (PQ), is 
                                                 
17 There is a controversial discussion about the correct actuarial adjustment rate in the German public pension 
system, see Ohsmann, Stolz and Thiede (2003) vs. Börsch-Supan (2000). 
18 Kommission für die Nachhaltigkeit in der Finanzierung der Sozialen Sicherungssysteme (2003). 
19 Börsch-Supan (2000), Börsch-Supan und Schnabel (1998, 1999), Börsch-Supan et al. (2003a,b). 
20 Ruland (2000) has succinctly expressed the relationship between earnings points and current pension value by 
regarding earnings points as “shares” in the “financial assets” held by the pension fund. The current pension 
value corresponds to the current “share price”. See Section 3.2 for a discussion of this view.   22





















) * α+1] 
where  
PVt:  Current pension value in year t 
ANW:  Average earnings net of public and private pension contributions
21 
PQ:  System dependency ratio [pensioners / (contributors + unemployed)]
  
Incorporating the sustainability factor in the benefit indexation formula links annual increases 
in pensions to productivity growth and the growth of the contribution base. The weighting 
factor α gives weight to each of these two determinants; it effectively spreads the financial 
burden among contributors and pensioners. If α equals zero, the current benefit indexation 
formula would remain unchanged and the financial burden generated by a higher proportion 
of pensioners in the population would mainly be shouldered by the labor force. α equals one 
implies a purely receipts-oriented pension expenditure policy. The German Reform 
Commission has set α to ¼ in order to target the contribution rates anchored in the Riester 
reform (contribution rate below 20 percent until 2020, under 22 percent until 2030). 
5.4 The NDC characteristics of the German pension system 
While there is no perfect equivalence, the three main elements of the German public pension 
system (the point system of credits, the actuarial adjustments, and the indexation to both 
earnings and system dependency) mimic the essential features of an NDC system. 
The point system includes all earnings over the life-time; almost all redistributive features of 
the German old-age pension system take the form of earnings points credited without actual 
earnings (e.g., years of unemployment, years of higher education, years of educating a child, 
etc., in each case valued at an imputed earnings level). The equivalence between the point 
system and an NDC system is not perfect since all earnings points count equally in the 
German point system, while in a NDC system the earnings necessary to gain one such 
earnings point are valued more when earned earlier in life due to compound interest. 
                                                 
21 The careful reader may note the difference in the ANW definitions which we choose to ignore here since we 
want to focus on the NDC characteristics. The current formula does not net out taxes and social insurance contri-
butions other than taxes, but does net out contributions to second and third pillar pensions at an imputed rate. It   23
One deviation from equivalence is the fact that the actuarial adjustments in the German 
system are not directly linked to life expectancy. The actual adjustment rates are somewhat 
arbitrary, probably too small and certainly controversial.
22  One of the advantages of a NDC 
system is to automatically generate the adjustment rates by the annuitization mechanism. 
The benefit indexation formula of the German DB system with its indexation to earnings 
growth and changes in the system dependency ratio approximates the effect of the 
accumulated interest in a NDC system, in which the internal rate of interest is the growth rate 
of the contribution bill (1+n)*(1+g). This is easy to see in the most stylized case when all 
contributions (normalized to one unit) are credited upfront. In this stylized NDC case the 
notional pension wealth after T years is T*(1+n)
T*(1+g)
T; the pension benefit is therefore 
P=T*(1+n)
T*(1+g)
T/G where G denotes the annuity factor (or “G-value”).  In the German DB 
system, this average worker earns T earnings points, and during these T years, the average 
pension value PV will increase with the rate of wage growth (g) and the growth rate of the 
dependency ratio (n, if the number of pensioners remains constant): PVT = PV0 
*(1+n)
T*(1+g)
T. Hence, the pension benefit is P= T*PV0*(1+n)
T*(1+g)
T, proportional to the 
NDC value. This stylized comparison may ignore many differences in detail: non-constant 
contributions will have a differential impact on the two formulae; net wages are likely to grow 
at a different rate than gross earnings; the system dependency ratio is likely to shrink faster 
than the labor force. The principles, however, are the same. What a country prefers as a 
pension policy – an almost textbook-like NDC system as in Sweden or a demography-indexed 
DB system as in Germany – is probably more dependent on the historical path of a country 
and the specific circumstances of the political debate than on abstract economics. 
6. Conclusions: Can NDC Systems Master the Challenges? 
Our summary starts with three claims about NDC systems that are not true. NDC systems are 
not automatically balancing: they do not automatically fulfill the PAYG budget constraint 
when economic parameters change. In particular, automatic balancing will not hold if 
annuities are frozen at retirement and the contribution rate is fixed since there is no feedback 
mechanism if longevity of current pensioners increases unexpectedly. Second, a NDC system 
                                                                                                                                                         
also computes the system dependency ratio using full-time equivalents for workers and pensioners. For these 
computational details, see Börsch-Supan and Wilke (2003). 
22 See footnote 14.   24
is also not automatically sustainable unless the contribution rate is fixed and the rate of return 
equals the contribution bill (or the system follows an equivalent trajectory). Third, a NDC 
system is no substitute for pre-funding. A NDC system does not change the basic PAYG 
mechanism in which the children pay for the pensions of their parents, and it does not create 
savings unless it generates a benefit cut which in turn precipitates savings. 
However, if correctly designed, a NDC system will automatically respond to changes in the 
demographic and macroeconomic environment because benefits are indexed to longevity (due 
to the annuitization mechanism), fertility and employment (through the notional rate of 
interest, if indexed to the contribution bill). 
Moreover, a NDC system has potentially important microeconomic effects. It will create a 
sense for actuarial fairness (because annual benefits in line with life-time contributions) and 
actuarial neutrality (because the system creates automatic adjustments to retirement age). It 
exposes redistribution because any non-contributory credits appear clearly marked on the 
account statements. 
A NDC system changes the rhetoric of pension systems. It makes people think in accounts, 
and thus may make the transition to partial funding psychologically easier. Moreover, by 
exposing the dwindling balance of first pillar pensions, it may create incentives to actually 
save in the second and third pillar. A NDC system makes workers and administrators think in 
“pension wealth” which may ease portability both within a country and between countries; it 
enables interpersonal transfers (e.g., between husband and spouse) and eases replacement of 
survivor pensions by independent pension claims. 
NDC systems also takes certain issues out of the political agenda, potentially easing reform. 
It minimizes the role of the “normal retirement age” and permits a more flexible choice 
between consumption (work longer) and leisure (get lower replacement rate). This flexibility 
finds its limitations in the conflict between actuarial neutrality and absence of labor supply 
disincentives and the necessity to establish an early retirement age. NDC systems also create 
a new set of „parameters“, another aspect of the new rhetoric, which may make reform more 
palatable. It permits redefinitions and readjustments and changes the focus of debate from 
parametric reform to the introduction of “a new system” (while this is not the case with 
respect to economic substance), thus enabling parameter change. This point is not without 
some irony, and even more so, because we claimed that NDC systems strengthen credibility 
through transparency, while we now use it as a device to deflect emotional opposition by   25
using a new rhetoric. 
The usage as a rhetorical and psychological device, however, should not be belittled, and 
insights among workers and pensioners precipitated by a new rhetoric may have real 
economic effects. By exposing the economics of a pay-as-you-go system, by visualizing the 
budget constraint of a pension system, and by making the trade off between retirement age 
and replacement rate concrete, NDC systems may induce economic reactions, such as later 
retirement or higher saving rates. 
In addition, the new rhetoric may help to get a pension reform process going because it 
provides a framework to introduce actuarial adjustments (since they come „automatically“), a 
framework to diffuse the explosiveness of changes in the retirement age (since a flexible 
choice of retirement age minimizes opposition), and a framework to change intergenerational 
redistribution in a genuine sense if, and only if, NDC systems make workers save more. 
Coming back to the challenges posed in Section 2, NDC systems are well positioned to 
manage the challenge of longevity. The are also well set up to react to slow changes in 
fertility, if the internal rate of interest is properly defined as the growth rate of the contribution 
bill. Sudden changes of fertility, however, such as the sudden babyboom/babybust transition, 
are not well manageable in NDC systems; countries, in which the younger generation is 
simply overwhelmed by the financial burden of pensions, need pre-funding, enabling the 
members of the older generation to carry part of the pension burden themselves. 
Design flaws of current DB systems (such as labor supply disincentives) are relatively well 
manageable in NDC systems; changing the rhetoric may be instrumental here. We have, 
however, already stressed the important distinction between absence of labor supply effects 
and actuarial neutrality. 
NDC systems are only indirectly devices to foster growth, savings, and capital market 
performance improvements. Since NDC systems are still PAYG devices, they do not alter the 
macroeconomic mechanisms at all; by changing the microeconomic incentives at least by 
psychological means, they precipitate substantial real effects after all – through later 
retirement and higher savings. In order to alter the growth path of an economy, NDC systems 
therefore must be coupled with a strengthening of second and third pillar pensions – this 
combination of NDC with pre-funding looks like one of the most fruitful paths of future 
pension reform.   26
References 
Berkel, B., and A. Börsch-Supan (2003): Pension Reform in Germany: The Impact on Re-
tirement Decisions, MEA Discussion Paper 31-03, Mannheim Research Institute for 
the Economics of Aging, Mannheim University. 
Börsch-Supan, A., 2000. ‘Incentive Effects of Social Security on Labour Force Participation: 
Evidence in Germany and Across Europe.’ Journal of Public Economics  78, 25-49. 
Börsch-Supan, A., and R. Schnabel, 1998, Social Security and Declining Labor Force Partici-
pation in Germany, American Economic Review 88.2, 173-178. 
Börsch-Supan, A., and R. Schnabel, 1999, Social Security and Retirement in Germany, in: J. 
Gruber and D.A. Wise (eds), International Social Security Comparions, University of 
Chicago Press: Chicago. 
Börsch-Supan, A. und M. Miegel (Hrsg.), 2001, Pension Reform in Six Countries, Springer. 
Heidelberg, New York, Tokyo. 
Börsch-Supan, A., and C. Wilke, 2003, The German Social Security System: How it Was and 
How it Will Be, MEA-Discussion Paper Prepared for the MRRC-Conference on Social 
Security, Washington, D.C. 
Börsch-Supan, A. und J. Winter, 2001, Population Aging, Savings Behavior, and Capital 
Markets. Working Paper No. 8561, National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER), 
Cambridge, Mass. 
Börsch-Supan, A., R. Palacios, and P. Tumberello. 1999. Pension Systems in the Middle East 
and North Africa: A Window of Opportunity. Pension Reform Primer. Washington, 
D.C.: World Bank. 
Börsch-Supan, A., R. Schnabel, S. Kohnz and G. Mastrobuoni. 2003. Budget Effects of Pen-
sion Reform in Germany, In: J. Gruber und D. Wise (eds.), Budget Effects of Reform-
ing Public Pension Systems, University of Chicago Press, in press. 
Börsch-Supan, A., S. Kohnz and R. Schnabel. 2003. Micro Modelling of Retirement Choices 
in Germany, In: J. Gruber und D. Wise (eds.), Incentive Effects of Public Pension Sys-
tems, University of Chicago Press: Chicago, in press. 
Chlon, Agnieszka, Marek Góra, and Michal Rutkowski. 1999. Shaping Pension Reform in 
Poland: Security through Diversity. Social Protection Discussion Paper 9923. Wash-
ington, D.C.: World Bank, Social Protection, August. 
Chłoń-Domińczak, Agnieszka, and Marek Góra. (2003). The NDC system in Poland – as-
sessment after 5 years. Paper prepared for the World Bank and RFV Conference on 
NDC Pensions, Sandhamn, Sweden. 
Disney, Richard. 1999. Notional Accounts as a Pension Reform Strategy: An Evaluation, So-
cial Protection Discussion Paper 9928. World Bank, Washington, D.C. 
Disney, Richard. 2003. Are Contributions to Public Pension Programmes a Tax? Paper pre-
pared for the Fourth Annual CeRP Conference, Turin, 16 September 2003. 
Fox, L., and E. Palmer. 1999. Latvian Pension Reform. Social Protection Discussion Paper 
Series No. 9922. The World Bank, Washington, D.C.   27
Franco, Daniele, and Nicola Sartor, Notional Defined Contribution in Italy: Unsatisfactory 
Present, Uncertain Future. Paper prepared for the Conference on NDC Pensions - 
Stockholm 28-30 September 2003. 
Frederick, S., G. Loewenstein and T. O’Donoghue. 2002. Time Discounting and Time Prefer-
ence: A Critical Review. Journal of Economic Literature 40, 351-401. 
Góra, Marek, and Michal Rutkowski. 1998. The Quest for Pension Reform: Poland’s Security 
through Diversity. Social Protection Discussion Paper 9815. Washington, D.C.: World 
Bank, Social Protection, October.  
Gruber, J., and D.A. Wise (eds.), 1999, Social Security and Retirement Around the World. 
University of Chicago Press: Chicago. 
Holzmann, Robert. 1997. “Pension Reform, Financial Market Development, and Economic 
Growth: Preliminary Evidence from Chile.” IMF Staff Papers 44(2, June): 149-78. 
Holzmann, Robert, M. Orenstein, and Michal Rutkowski. 2003. Pension Reform in Europe: 
Progress and Process. Washington, D.C.: World Bank. 
Homburg, S. (1988), Theorie der Alterssicherung, Berlin, Heidelberg, New York: Springer. 
Institut der deutschen Wirtschaft (IW, 2003), Deutschland in Zahlen, Köln: Deutscher Insti-
tuts Verlag. 
Kommission für die Nachhaltigkeit in der Finanzierung der Sozialen Sicherungssysteme 
(2003): Abschlußbericht. Bundesministerium für Gesundheit und Soziale Sicherheit, 
Berlin. (http://www.bmgs.bund.de/deu/gra/themen/sicherheit/kommission/index.cfm). 
Legros, Florence. 2003. “Notional Defined Contributions: A Comparison of the French and 
the German Point systems”, Paper prepared for the World Bank and RFV Conference 
on NDC Pensions, Sandhamn, Sweden. (http://www.rfv.se/konferens/index.htm). 
Lindeman, David, David Robalino and Michal Rutkowski. (2003). NDC Pension Schemes in 
Middle and Low Income Countries: Promises and Constraints. Paper prepared for the 
World Bank and RFV Conference on NDC Pensions, Sandhamn, Sweden. 
(http://www.rfv.se/konferens/index.htm). 
OECD (1988). Ageing Populations: Social Policy Implications, Paris: OECD. 
Ohsmann, S. and U. Stolz and R. Thiede, 2003. Rentenabschläge bei vorgezogenem Renten-
beginn: Welche Abschlagssätze sind “richtig”? Die Angestelltenversicherung, Heft 4. 
Palmer, E. 2000. The Swedish Pension Reform Model: Framework and Issues, Social Protec-
tion, Discussion Paper Series No. 0012, The World Bank, Washington, D.C. 
Palmer, E. 2003. Conversion to NDC – Issues and Models, Paper Presented at the World 
Bank and Swedish Social Insurance Board Conference on NDC Pensions, Sandhamn, 
28-30 September 2003 (http://www.rfv.se/konferens/index.htm). 
Ruland, F. (2000): Neugestaltung der Rentenformel im bestehenden Umlageverfahren. Vor-
trag bei Speyerer Sozialrechtsgesprächen, www.vdr.de.  
Rutkowski, Michal. 1998. “A New Generation of Pension Reforms Conquers the East: A 
Taxonomy in Transition Economies.” Transition 9 (4, August).  
Schmidt-Hebbel, Klaus. 1998. “Does Pension Reform Really Spur Productivity, Saving, and 
Growth.” Working Paper 33. Central Bank of Chile, Santiago, April.   28
Schnabel, Reinhold, 1998, Rates of Return of the German Pay-As-You-Go Pension System, 
Finanzarchiv, 55(3), 374-399. 
Settergren, O., 2001. The Automatic Balance Mechanism of the Swedish Pension System, 
Wirtschaftspolitische Blätter 2001/4. 
Valdés-Prieto, Salvador, ed. 1998. The Economics of Pensions: Principals, Policies, and In-
ternational Experience. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press. 
Valdés-Prieto, Salvador. 2000. “The Financial Stability of Notional Account Pensions.” 
Scandinavian Journal of Economics. 
Valdés-Prieto, Salvador. 2003. Instantaneous funding of NDC plans. Paper prepared for the 
World Bank and RFV Conference on NDC Pensions, Sandhamn, Sweden. 
(http://www.rfv.se/konferens/index.htm). 
World Bank. 1994. Averting the Old-Age Crisis: Policies to Protect the Old and Promote 
Growth. New York: Oxford University Press. Discussion Paper Series 
 
Mannheim Research Institute for the Economics of Aging Universität Mannheim 
 
To order copies, please direct your request to the author of the title in question. 
 
Nr. Autoren  Titel  Jahr
28-03 Axel  Börsch-Supan, 
Alexander Ludwig, 
Joachim Winter 
Aging, pension reform, and capital flows: A multi-
country simulation model 
03 
29-03 H.-M.  von  Gaudecker 
Carsten Weber 
 
Surprises in a Growing Market Niche: An Analysis 
of the German Private Annuities Market 
03 
30-03 Axel  Börsch-Supan, 
Anette Reil-Held, 
Christina B. Wilke 
Der Nachhaltigkeitsfaktor und andere 
Formelmodifikationen zur langfristigen 
Stabilisierung des Beitragssatzes zur GRV 
03 
31-03  Barbara Berkel    
Axel Börsch-Supan 
Renteneintrittsentscheidungen in Deutschland: 
Langfristige Auswirkungen verschiedener 
Reformoptionen 
03 
32-03 Axel  Börsch-Supan, 
Hendrik Jürges, 
OliverLipps 
SHARE: Building a Panel on Health, Aging and 
Retirement in Europe 
03 
33-03  Florian Heiss  Wie groß soll die Schwankungsreserve der 
gesetzlichen Rentenversicherung sein? 
03 
34-03 Axel  Börsch-Supan, 
Christina B. Wilke 
The German Public Pension System: 
How it Was, How it Will Be 
03 
35-03 Lothar  Essig, 
Anette Reil-Held 
Chancen und Risiken der „Riester-Rente“ 
 
03 
36-03  Barbara Berkel    
Axel Börsch-Supan 
Pension Reform in Germany:                            
The Impact on Retirement Decisions                        
03 
37-03 Axel  Börsch-Supan, 
Anette Reil-Held and 
Christina Benita 
Wilke 
How to make a Defined Benefit System 
Sustainable: 
The “Sustainability Factor” in the German Benefit 
Indexation Formula 
03 
38-03  Melanie Lührmann  Demographic Change, Foresight and International 
Capital Flows 
03 
39-03  Joachim Winter and 
Lothar Essig 
Item nonresponse to financial questions in 
household surveys: An experimental study of 
interviewer and mode effects 
03 
40-03  Christoph Buchheim  Das Zusammenspiel von Wirtschaft, Bevölkerung 
und Wohlstand aus historischer Sicht 
03 
41-03 Oliver  Lipps  Stochastische  Bevölkerungsprognose für West- 
und Ostdeutschland 
03 